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ABSTRACT
We investigate how the ability of the government to depart from budget balance and issue
debt expands the set of equilibria that can be supported using lump-sum tax-transfer instnirnents. We
show how this depends on the restrictions that exist on the capacity to tax and make transfer
payments, and what these restrictions imply for the government's ability to issue debt.
Central to our analysis is the defmition of solvency for an infinite-lived government in an
infinite-lived economy with overlapping generations of finite-lived households. Our specification is
derived from the demand for public debt by private agents and the non-negativity constraints on the
capital stock and on private consumption by all generations. Under fairly tight restrictions on the
government's tax-transfer menu, our solvency constraint implies the conventional solvency constraint.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers Ponzi finance is always possible but 'inessential": it
does not expand the set of equilibria that can be supported. Ponzi finance can be "essential" when
taxes and transfers are restricted. The paper establishes a number of results that demonstrate how the
government's ability to issue debt allows restricted tax-transfer schemes to support all equilibria
attainable using unresiricted taxes and transfers.
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(I) INTRODUCTION.
Does the ability of the government to depart from budget balance and issue or
retire debt expand or alter the set of equilibria that can be supported? We address
this question for the case in which fiscal policy, involving, in addition to borrowing,
the use of lump—sum taxes and transfers only, can be used for redistribution and
insurance among heterogeneous households 1•Heterogeneityis introduced using an
OLG model without private intergenerational gifts2.
The answer turns out to depend crucially on the richness of the set of
lump—sum tax—transfer instruments available and on the restrictions that this implies
for the government's ability to issue debt. Central to the argument is our solvency
constraint for an infinite—lived government3 in an infinite—lived economy with
overlapping generations of finite—lived households. The government is solvent if its
budgetary and financing policies are feasible currently and in all future periods. In
our model, government solvency is expressed as a set of three inequality constraints
on admissible sequences of taxes, transfers, public debt and exhaustive public
spending. They are derived from the requirement that the capital stock and private
consumption by each generation be non—negative in each period. In other words,
solvency for the infinite—lived government is derived from the (well—understood)
requirement of solvency (or non—bankruptcy) for each finite—lived household.
Consider economies in which the long—run real interest rate is above the
long—run growth rate of efficiency labor. Under fairly tight restrictions on the ability
of the government to use taxes and transfers freely, our solvency constraint implies
the conventional solvency constraint, that the sequence of real public debt discounted
at the real interest rate converges to zero. The first sufficient condition is that net
transfer payments by the government to a generation during a period cannot change
sign (from positive when young to negative when old) over that generation's life2
cycle. The second sufficient condition is that the long—run growth rate of transfers
to the young and taxes on the old is less than the long—run interest rate.If, for
instance, taxes and transfers cannot grow faster in the long run than efficiency labor,
or equivalently, if the ratio of taxes paid (transfers received) during a period by a
generation to the value of the physical resources owned by it, is bounded, the second
sufficient condition would be met.
Under less restrictive conditions on taxes and transfers, Ponzi finance may be
possible, regardless of the relationship between the long—run real interest rate andthe
long—run real growth rate, andregar&essof whether the economy is dynamically
efficient or Pareto—efficient. We distinguish betweenessentialPouzi finance, that
is Ponzi schemes that expandtheset of equilibria for consumption andcapital
formation that canbesupported, andinessentialPonzi finance that does not
haveany real effects. The same essential—inessential distinction is made for
public debt as such- Whether or not public debt (Ponzi finance) is essential
depends on the restrictions imposed on the government's ability to use taxes
and transfers.
We establish three equivalence results'. The first states that with
unrestricted time— and age—specific taxes and transfers, the ability to depart
from budget balance does not permit additional equilibria to be supported.
Specifically,any intergenerational redistribution and insurance thatcanbe
provided with government borrowing or lending can also be provided with a
balanced government budget.
The second states that, if there are restrictions on the government's
ability to levyage—specific taxes andmake age—specific transfers during any
givenperiod, then the option of unbalancing the budget enhances the set of
equilibriathat can be supported. Specifically, if the government is
constrained to have only age—independent taxes and transfers, the ability to3
unbalancethe budget permits the government to support all the equilibria that
canbesupported with unrestricted age—specific taxes and transfers.
This secondproposition will not in general hold if the conventional
government solvency constraint is imposed, and requires our less restrictive
solvency constraint in order to be valid. Essential Ponzi finance
characterizes the age—independent tax—transfer policies.
Our third equivalence proposition is that even rather severe restrictions
on the variation of taxes and transfers over the lifetime of a generation do
not restrict the equilibria that can be supported, provided unbalanced budgets
are permitted. This result holds under the conventional solvency constraint
and does not require Ponzi finance.
The substitution of government borrowing for current lump—sumtaxes(and
suchfurther future changes in lump—sum taxes, transfers and borrowing as may
be required to preserve governmentsolvency) will affect the equilibrium of an
economy if it redistributes resources among private agents with different
marginal propensities to spend. In the Samuelson [l9S8 overlapping
generations (OLC) model used in our paper, there is heterogeneity between
generations. Typically, postponing taxation through borrowing or
redistributing directly from the young to the old will reduce aggregate
saving. Such "financial crowding out" has been a central theme of
macroeconomics.
Alternative government financing policies not only effect redistribution
among generations, in a stochastic environment they will also permit trades
across states of nature or intergenerational insurance. There is by now quite
a rich literature on this subject. Such intergenerational redistribution schemes
associal security taxes and retirement benefits can provide insurance that either
cannot be provided by the market or is provided ineffidently5. OLC models have4
incompletemarket participation. Because individual households cannot enter
into insurance contracts before they are born, there may be incomplete
risk—sharing(Blanchard and Veil [1992]). Even in a dynamically.efficient
economy, the public provision of this insurance can have implications for
Pareto-efficiency (see Zilcha [1990] and Blanchard and Veil [1992fl.6
Rather than investigating the many interesting positive and welfare aspects
of intergenerational redistribution and of the provision of intergenerational
insurance through the government budget (see e.g. Fischer (1983), Enders and
Lapan [1982], Stiglitz (1983], Merton (19841,Gordonand Varian (1988), Pagano
[1988] and Gale [1990]), we shall focus on the equivalence results, on the
implications of our definition of government solvency, on the conditions under
whichPonzi finance is possible and on the role of Pouzi finance.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section II develops
the model. Section III introduces our government solvency constraint, relates
it to the conventional solvency constraint and discusses what it implies for
the scope for Ponzi finance. Section IV contains our three equivalence
results and analyzes how they depend on the ability of the government to
engage in Ponzi finance. Section V concludes.
(II) TEE IDDEL.
Considerthe closed economy one—good version of Diamond's [1965]
two—period OLGmodelwith government borrowing or lending andlump—sum taxes
or transfers. Individuals of the samegenerationare identical. Successive
generations have the same utility functions and maximize expected utility.
People live for two periods, work in the first period of life and retire in
the second.There is no intergenerational gift or bequest motive. Labor
supply is inelastic and scaled to unity for each young worker. The youngS
have access to two stores of value, claims on risky real capital and potentially
risky public debt.'
Theoptimization problem of a competitive representative consumer born in
period tisgiven in equations (11.2) and (II.3a,b). c and r ,I=1,2, are
consumption, respectively taxes paid,by a member of generation t inthe
period of her life. w is the wage rate in period t. and b are the amounts of
capital, respectively bonds or securities, held by a member of generation tat
the end of period t.Forsimplicity, all securities are assumed to have a
one—period maturity. Pt 5theprice in period t of a security that entitles
one to a gross payment (coupon) of units of output in period t+1, with
> > 0.This payment may be stochastic. The one—period interest rate on
debtcarried into periodt+1,r41 is defined by
(11.1) 1 + r+t
isthe rental rate of a unitofcapital in periodt+1. is the expectation
operator conditional on information held at the beginning of periodt.




subject to the sequence of budget constraints given in (II.3a,b).
(II.3a) — —￿ +
(II.3b) c + r 1(1 + pt+i)k + t+i1
s to
Since utility is strictly increasing in c1 and c2, (II.3a,b) will hold with
equality.




Output Y is produced by a twice continuously differentiable production
function With constant returns to capital A' andlaborin efficiency units DL and
(II.4a)
(II. 4b)6
positive and diminishing marginal products: 4_ = = f(k)
f> 0;f''0.Italso satisfies the Inada conditions. Productivity is modeled
as labor—augmenting. L is labor in natural units and C the level of
labor—augmenting productivity. 0canbe random and is assumed to have positive
support; for finite t, 9 is also assumed to be bounded from above. Our
equivalence results do not depend on this particular parameterization of uncertainty.
The growthrate of labor—augmenting productivity w is defined by
I+





The government imposes lump—sum taxes (transfers when negative) on the
young and/or the old, spends a non—negative amount on public consumptionl3 and
satisfies its single—period budget identity by borrowing or lending.Bt is
the stock of government bonds at the beginning of period t andthe amount




Population (assumed equal to the labor force) grows at the constant
proportional rate n >—1.By choice of units we set =1.Vith






—11 £ —1 E(1+r1)p1b1 +— 9[r —r1(1+n)I
Theeconomy—wide asset market equilibrium conditions are given by
=L147
=LI4
Substituting the asset market equilibrium conditions into (II.3a) yields:
(11.8) (Ptbg+1 + + n)(l+wt+i)=
(lDg
— —
Thelump—sum taxes levied (transfers paid) by the government and the
coupon payment on the public debt can be stochastic. We assume for simplicity
that the government does not introduce additional noise into the system (Ct is
non—stochastic), but that taxes and debt coupon payments can be made contingent
on current and past realizations of the random variable & Letbe the sequence




(III)GOVERMENT SOLVENCY AN]) P01(11 FINANCE IN AN INFINITE—LrvED ECONONY.
Solving the government single—period budget identity forward in time for
T0 periods, we get for all t ￿ 0












We also define the market discount factor A as follows:
t+i
—TTr 1 1— £Jill = jf1 + r-J
—
3
Notethat 6 is the "labor—force--growth—and—productivity--growth--adjusted"
discount factor. Both 8t+i and 6t+i are assumed to be positive for finite8
values of t+i andnon—negativein the limit as t+i-'w
The conventional government solvency constraint, given in (111.3)
requiresthe discounted public debt to vanish in the long run for any realization
of the discounted debt sequence.




(111.4)5_t_6t = + —
Thesolvency condition (111.3) has the prima facie attractive property of
implying the same kind of present value or intertemporal budget constraint
(111.4) for the infinite horizon case as for the finite horizon case. If
t—1+T is the finite terminal period, then the standard (and uncontroversial)
governmentsolvency constraint is p 1+Tbt+T ￿ 0 (the government doesn't owe
anythingat the end of the last period). A rational household sector ensures
that Pt_1+Tbt+T ￿ 0. From (111.1) these two weak inequalities imply, that the
value of the current stock of debt is equal to the (expectation of) the
presentdiscounted value of future primary(non—interest) surpluses. This is
the same as (111.4), with jim dropped. The imposition of (111.3) has been
quasi—automatic in moden macroeconomic analysis. For a very small sample see
Barro [1979] ,Buiter[1985] ,Pagano[1988] andBlanchardet. al. [1990]. It
has been the subject of extensive empirical testing (seee.g. Hamilton and
Flavin [1986J, Wilcox [1989], Corsetti [1990], Grilli [1990) and BuiterandPatel
[1991]).
Webelieve that the analogy with the finite—horizon case is potentially
misleading. It is by no means obvious what are, in an economy without a
terminal date, the feasible debt strategies of an infinite—livedgovernment9
facing an infinite sequence of finite—lived overlapping generations (see e.g.
Shell [1971] and Vilson [1981]). As we shall see, without a—priori
restrictionson taxes and transfers, our model has a surprising range of
feasible debt strategies, manyofwhich allow for Ponzi finance. Formally,
Ponzifinance can bedefinedas follows for our model:
Definition 1: Pouzi finance.
Thegovernment engages in Ponzi finance if
(IlLS) ptBt+i ￿ (1+ rt)pjB for all t ￿ 0. 16
Thegovernment engages in Ponzi finance if, in each period, t, the value
of the debt carried into the next period, t+1, is at least as large as the
costof servicing the debt carried into period t.From the government's
single—periodbudget identity it follows, that a government engages in Ponzi
finance if —(rLt
+ ￿ 0 for all t,thatis, if it never runs a
primary (non—interest) budget surplus.
In Section IV we are also interested in sequences of new debt minus old
debt service, {ptBt+j—(1+ r)plB}T0 that,while not themselves Ponzi
schemes, possess infinite subsequences — (1+ r)pt_jBJ....othat
22 2232
are Ponzi schemes.
Ye proceed by investigating what kind of constraints the model of Section
II imposes on the government's ability to issue debt. Equation (11.8),
stating that the savings of the young in period tequal the sum of the capital
stock andthe value of the stock of government debt carried into period t+1,
can berearranged as equation (111.6)
(111.6) PtBt+l +rLt=
—Ktl[w —4]Lt10
Equation (II.3b) (holding with equality), stating that the old consume




Itis immediately obvious from (111.6) that, for given Kt÷i,Wv and
thevalue of the public debt issued in period t, PtBt÷icanbe made
arbitrarily large (positive or negative) by making matching large (positive or
negative)period t transfers to the young, _rLt. Such an arbitrarily large
(positive or negative) value of PtBt+i is consistent with equation (111.7) for
givenr+1. Kt+j, 4andL2, as long as period ti-I taxes on the old, rLt
are assigned a matching large (positive or negative value).
Since 4and are non—negative, the constraint on public debt implied
by (111.6) is ptBt+l + ￿ There also is a lower bound on the
amount of public debt that can be issued (or an upper bound on the stock of
public credit to the private sector). It follows from non—negativity of
consumption by the old in period t. From the resource constraint
Kti —= wL+ — 4L—c1L1
—
Gtand c1￿0it follows that
(Vt— 4)L—+ (1+P)Kt
—
Kt+i￿ 0 .From(111.6) this implies
+￿Ct —(l+pt)Kt
These upper and lower bounds on the public debt in each period, together
with the requirement that exhaustive public spending cannot be negative and
cannot exceed the total physical resources available in any period, constitute
our definition of feasible fiscal policy. A solvent government is a
government whose fiscal policy is feasible in a world with rational private
agents'7.11
Definition2: Covernient solvency.
Agovernment is solvent if and only if its debt, taxes, transfer payments
and exhaustive spending satisfy, for all t ￿ 0
(IlL8a) ptBt+l + rLt wiLt
or, equivalently




(11L8b') (1+rt)pt,B_ r 1L1￿
Equations (JILSa and b) plus non—negativity of G imply:
(iIL8c) 0 ￿ G ￿ wL +(1+pt)Kg
Notethat this definition of solvency can be generalized easily to all
OLG models with finite household horizons. It relies only on the reasonable
postulate that in the last period of its life, each household disposes of all
real and financial assets (including public debt) and pays off any debts it
has carried into that period and does not purchase any new assets or incur any
new debt.
Since the government solvency constraint is derived from the requirement
that 4,c1and X ? 0 for all t ￿ 0, another way of interpreting it is that
the government refrains from policies that will bankrupt the private sector:
it does not select sequences for taxes, transfer payments, debt and exhaustive
spending that will cause the non—negativity constraints on consumption by both
generations and on the capital stock to become binding'8.
The solvency conditions (III.Sa and b') can be rewritten as
(III.9a) PtBt+t +rLt￿ {f(kt) —ktf'(k)]Ot(1+n)t
(III.9b') —(l+r)ptBt ￿ [1+f'(k)]kt9t(1+n)t12
Equation (III.Oa) implies that the long—nm growth rate of the total
resourcetransfer from the young generation to the government (whether through
purchases by the young of government debt or through taxes on the young)
cannotexceed the long—run growth rate of efficiency labor. Note that there
is no constraint on ptBt+i or rLt separately, only on their sum.
Equation (III.Db') implies that the long—run growth rate of the total
resource transfer from the old generation to the government (whether through
explicittaxes on the old or through the servicing of debt to the government
incurred by the old) cannot exceed the long—run growth rate of efficiency
labor.Note that there is no constraint on or (l+rt)ptiB
separately, only on their sum.
If the long—nm interest rate exceeds the long—run growth rate of
efficiency labor (urn At9(1+n)t =0)then the solvency constraints
(III.8a and b) imply
liminf{At[ptBti + rLtJ} <0
V-'tti'(t<m
lim sup{At[ptBt+i + rLt]} ￿ 0, t'-tt'(t(cz,
Ifthelimitinferior and thelimitsuperior are the same, we get
(111.10) urn At[ptliti + =lim[riLti —(1+rt)pt1Bt]
=
t4T t-'m
Notehow this differs from the conventional solvency constraint
lint AtPtBt+i =0.Equation (111.10) states that the present discounted value
t4tD
of the total resource transfer from theyoung to the government andthe
present discounted value of the total resource transfer from the old to the
government should converge to zero. Without further restrictions on 4and
equation(111.10) does not constrain the behavior of the public debt or
thepublic credit in the long run.13
Ponzifinance with unrestricted taxes andtransfers:a siMple ezaaple.
Asa simple illustration of the kind of borrowing policies that are
feasible with unrestricted taxes and transfers, consider the deterministic
version of our model with a logarithmic utility function,
v(4) +flv(c)
=(1—t,)ln4+qlnc
,0,1. The consumer's equilibrium
in this case is given by
2









Consumptionwhen young andold, 4andc, are functions only of the
present discounted value of life—time resources,w —
— Savingby
t+1
the young (their aggregate demand for government bonds and realcapital),
however,is, for well—how life—cycle reasons, not a function of the present
discounted value of life—time resources alone. We can rewrite (111.13) as
follows:
2 2
Etti += [(wt—— i:rt+i)÷ l:rti]Lt
The young of period t will demand more financial assets, cet. par., if
they expect to have to pay a larger tax when they are old, regardless of
the present discounted value of their life—time resources. The demand for
saving by the young depends on the actual distribution of disposable
(after—tax) resources over the lifetime. They will save more while young if14
the distribution of lifetime disposable resources is skewed towards youth. If
the government has the ability to tax the members of any given generation
differently when they are young than when they are old, it can influence the
savings behavior of the young and with it the demand for its debt. By raising
r2
[—qr
+(1_,)i÷]Lt while keeping+ and Gconstant, the
government canraisesaving by the young by anyamount withoutaffecting
consumption by the young or the old (or the demand for capital as a productive
input). The government can therefore increase its debt without bound.
Consider two euilibria, the single—star equilibrium andthedouble—star
equilibrium.Assume that (111.14) holds for all t ￿ 0, and thatthe initial








For concreteness, let the single—star equilibrium have a balanced budget in
each period and zero public debt, that is
1* 2* *
It L + r_t_i
= andB =0for all t ￿ 0
We define and as follows:
14"P 2** 2*
It










Thus,by choosing appropriately growing values for Et, t ￿ 0, (that is
values such that > (1÷nr'(l+rt)), wecanraise the growth rate of
public debt in any period to any level. Since thepresent discounted value of15
lifetimetaxes is the same in the single star and the double star equilibrium,
the equilibrium private consumption sequences are the same, and so will be the
wage rate, capital stock, interest rate and debt price sequences. By making a
larger transfer to the young of generation t, the government provides the
young with the means for increasing their saving. By levying a larger tax on
that same generationwhen old, the government provides the young with an
incentivetosave in order to pay these higher taxes.
ifl 2** *1 Since =rLt —tLtand rt iLti =_rtL +(l+rt)ct_iLt_i +
wenote that when aPonzi game is played (/c > (14n11(1+rt)), the total
taxon the young, r Lt, will ultimately become negative and increasingly
large in absolute value, while the tax on the old, r'Lti, will become an
increasingly large positive number. Ye will therefore see the lifetime
pattern of taxes becoming one of ever increasing receipts of transfer payments
whenyoung and ever increasing tax payments whenold. The lifetime pattern
of taxes therefore has to change signor zig—zag.
Itis obvious that this property generalizes to any finite household
horizon OLG model: what is required is that in the last period of a
household's life, the government be able to recoup in present value terms the
non—balanced budget component of what it has transferred to the household in
theearlier periods of its life.
Another way of interpreting this is that the debt can grow without bound
(and at a rate higher than the interest rate) without affecting the
equilibrium allocations for consumption and the capital stock,because the
governmentcan, effectively, tax the debt held by the old to pay for the
servicing of the debt held by the old. Government debt held by the old
increases the "base" on which lump—sum taxes on the old can be levied 20•
McCallum[1984] ,madethis point in the context of an infinite—lived16
representativeagent model 21(see also Bohn [1991]). Spaventa [1987, 1988]
also emphasizes the distinction between models in which only endowments can be
taxed(such as Pagano [1988])and modelsin which interest income too is
taxable. He, however, doesnot make the distinction between taxes on the
young,taxes on the old and aggregate taxes. As we shall see below, aggregate
taxes can be zero, and therefore less than the endowment (wage income) and
less that the sum of the endowment and interest income, while the debt grows
at a rate at least equal to the rate of interest forever.
Govemaent solvency and Ponzi finance with and without restrictions on taxes
and transfers.
Thesame point can bemade slightly more generally by considering the
fullset of equilibrium conditions for our model. Given and
(1÷r)p1b0, a competitive equilibrium of the two—period OLO model
satisfies equations (111.16) to (111.20) for all t ￿ 0.
(111.16)v'(4) = +
(111.17) v'(4) =_Et[7t(01)v'(c)}t[(1+ r÷1)v'(c)J






(111.20) ptb+i(1+n)(1+wt+i) + g
—ç' [r(e) + (1..1.nr'r1(en
s (l+r)p ibt +— ç1 fr(e)
+(1+n)r1(e)]
Itis clear by inspection of equations (111.16) to (111.19), that given
the initial capital stock and government debt service, and for a give sequence
of exhaustive public spending thesolutions for consumption, 4and
and the capital—labor ratio (in efficiency units), kt+I, for all t ￿ 0 are
influenced by the remaining budgetary variables (taxes, transfers, public debt
issues and public debt service) only through two terms. The first is
(1+&ti)(1+n)ptbti +#r!, thetotal resource transfer from the young in
period t to the government, both through purchases of government debt and
through explicit taxes. The second is (i+rt)pib —
+ g
—(i+nY'ç11r1,thetotal resource transfer from the
government to the old in period t,boththrough debt service and through
explicit transfers to the old.
Note that, from (111.20), (i+n)(1+e/t+i)pbt+1 +
= t+ltbt
—(i+n)Or1:what the government takes from the young in any
givenperiod,whether through borrowing or through taxes, it must either use
to finance its exhaustive spending program or give to the old, through debt
service or transfer payments. What the single—period government budget
identity in (1.11.20) implies for the behavior of ptbt+I, 7tbt, ,jand
individually, is of no interest from the point of view of the behavior of
consumption and the capital stock, once we know the behavior of
(1÷n)(i+ut+i)ptbt+i + orof 7tbt —(l+n)9r1
We now investigate how the solvency constraint, given in
(III.8a,b and c), is affected by various restrictions on the ability of the
government to set age— and time—contingenttaxesand transfers.Ve also18
investigatehow such restrictions affect the government's ability to run Ponzi
schemes and the implications for resource allocation of feasible Ponzi
schemes.
Case1: Unrestricted age— and ti.e—contingent taxes and transfers.
Whenthere are no restrictions, other than those implied by
(III8.a andb)on taxes andtransfers,we canestablish the following result.
Proposition1.
Withunrestricted age—, time— and state—contingent taxes and transfers,
any equilibrium for consumption by the young and the old and for the
capital stock can be supported with an infinity of Porszi schemes.
Proof:Ye assert that, if there exists an equilibrium (the single star
1* 2* **** i2 *
equilibrium,say) c ,c_1,w ,kt,r, It,bfor t ￿ 0, for a
given feasible sequence of exhaustive public spending, t ￿ 0, then there
also exist, for the same sequence of exhaustive public spending, (infinitely
many) equilibria (the double star equilibria) 4*,c;,k;,r, pt
1st2** ** 15* 1* 25* 2* *** it, , b.for t￿0 such that c =c,c1
=c_1,w =
= k,r =r,P =pandp5b1
—p1b(1+n)_l(1+Wt+l)1￿
**** * I I rPt_ibt(1+nY (l+wti)for all t ￿ 0
Forthe double star taxes and debtto support the same consumption and
capital stock equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that





—(1+nY1c1rr for all t ￿ 0.
For the debt to grow at least as fast as the rate of interest forever, it19
must be true that for all t ￿ 0
**4 *** I1" 2*4
(111.22)(1+n)(I÷/t+i)Ptb+1—(1+rt+i)pt1b =g—C[rt +ri(1÷n) J￿0
The two choice variables during period t in equation (111.22) are
24* 24*
and rb_i. No matter what value is assigned to r1 ' canalways be
assigned a large enough negative value to ensure that (111.22) is satisfied:
the debt grows at least as fast as the rate of interest.
From the single—period government budget identity, it follows that
(III.21a) and (III.21b) are the same constraint. No matter what value is
assigned to r4t, •a value can be assigned to that ensures that
(III.21a,b) are satisfied for any values of rr, rn, bt, b4
and bt+i .0
Another way of putting this is that, by increasing _r**Lt for any given
values of rtiLti and and for any inherited value of (l+r)piBt ,itis
possible to raise the growth rate of the public debt to any positive level
without affecting PtBt+i +rLt,
the term on the left—hand side of the
solvency constraints (III.Sa and b). rt_jLt can then be chosen to ensure that
**2*4
(l+rt)p_iB —rt_iLt_i,the term on the left—hand side of (III.8a' and b')
satisfies these inequalities. The government simply reshuffles a constant
total resource transfer away from the young in period t, +
betweenborrowed resources, ptBt+i, and explicit taxes, r let; Appropriating
for its own use an amount of resources equal to the value of exhaustive public
spending, Gt, it pays out the remainder to the old, either as debt service,
(1+rt)ptiBr or
;:4transht.5
_r.Lt. Again it is only the total,
(1+rt)p_1Bt —rt_iLt
that matters for the conswnption of the old.20
Corollary.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers, the competitive equihbriurrt model
with the finite—lived OLG household sector does not require any bounds on the
level or rate of rowth of public debt. Ponzi finance is therefore always possible,
regardless of the relationship between the interest rate and the growth rate,
regardless of whether the economy is dynamically efficient and regardless of
whether the economy is Pareto—efficient.
Case 2: Restrictions on differences in taxes and transfers in any period for
overlappinggenerations.
Threeinteresting restrictions fitting this category come to mind.
(a) Equal taxes or transfers per generation for all generations alive
daringany given period.
In this case r(1÷n) = forall t ￿ 0.In Section (IV) weshowthat
this restriction does not bite. The long—run growth rate of the debt (over
2—periodintervals) equals the interest rate, even when theinterest rate is
abovethe growth rate of efficiencylabor. Such Ponzi finance subsequences
are "essential": without them the restrictions on taxes and transfers would
affectthe equilibria that canbe supported.
(b)Equal per capita taxes or transfers for allgenerations alive during
any given period.
Inthis case 4 forall t ￿ 0. In Section (IV) we show that this
restriction too does not bite. The long—run growth rateof the debt (over 2
periodintervals) equals the sum of the interest rate and the growth rate of
the labor force. EssentialPonzifinance subsequences therefore play a role
whenever the growth rate of the labor force is non—negative.21
(c) Equal taxes per unit of efficiency labor for all generations alive
during any given period.
In this case =(1+wt)r_i
for all t ￿ 0. In Section (IV) we also show
this restriction to be toothless. The long—run growth rate of the debt (over
2—period intervals) is the sum of the interest rate and the growth rate of
efficiency labor. Such Ponzi finance subsequences are essential.
What drives these results is that even though the two generations (the
young andtheold) alive inany givenperiod are treated in the same way
duringthat period, we can still vary taxes and transfers freely over the
life—cycleof each generation, making transfer payments to them while young
andtaxing them when old.
Case 3: Restrictions on variations in taxes and transfers over its lifeti.e
for any given generation.
Themost interesting restriction is that net taxes in each of the two
periods of a household's life must have the same sign, that is
=t4 A ￿ 0 for all t?0.
We need just one of the weak inequalities of the solvency constraint in
order to show that, under this restriction, Ponzi finance is possible only if
the interest rate is below the growth rate of efficiency labor. Consider
equations (III.8a) and (III.Ba'), rewritten for this case as
(III.23a) PtRt+l ￿ [f(kt) —ktf'(kt)]OtLt
—4Lt
(III.23b) (1+rti)pB+i ￿ [f(kti) —kt+if'(kt+i)]Ot+iLt+i
+AtrLt
—ct+i
From(III.23a), the only way for the debt to grow faster than the growth
rate of efficiency labor forever, is for 4tobe negative and for —4togrow
at a rate higher than the growth rate of labor productivity. If the debt
grows faster than the growth rate of efficiency labor forever, (III.23b) can22
onlybe satisfied if AtrLt is positive and has a growth rate higher than the
growth rate of efficiency labor. That is impossible since At .0.Ve
conclude that —r can grow no faster than the growth rate of labor
productivity and that the growth rate of the debt can therefore be no higher
than the growth rate of efficiency labor. The debt can therefore grow faster
than the interest rate forever only if the interest rate is below the growth
rate of efficiency labor.
Note that Case 3 includes quite a variety of fiscal rules, including per
capita taxes (or transfers) constant across generations at a point in time,
and growingover time at a constant proportional rate u, thatis 4= =
= r0(l+v)'forall t ? 0. Note that our argumentimplies that vcannot be
permanentlyhigher that the growth rate of labor productivity.
Blanchard and Veil [1992J considered the special case of this model where
the labor force is constant (n =0),there is no productivity growth (°= 0
for all t ￿ 0), there is no exhaustive public spending (Ct =0for all t ￿ 0)
and there are no taxes or transfers (r0 =0).In their model, debt obviously
cannot grow faster than wage income in the long rim. In the deterministic
version of their model, this means that only in a dynamically inefficient
equilibriwn can there be viable Ponzi schemes, with the public debt growing
forever at least as fast as the interest rate but no faster than the growth
rate of labor income.
In general (that is, even if net taxes can change sign over the life
cycle), if the long—run rate of interest exceeds the long—rim growth rate of
the disposable income of the young (wages net of taxes on the young), that is,
if lint {At{Ot(f(kt)_ktf(kt))_4](1+n)t} =0,equations(III.8a, or a')
imply23
(111.24) urn inf{AtptBti) ￿ 0
t'-wt'<t(a
Fromthe public credit constraint (III.8b) or (I1I.Sb') it follows that,
ifthe long—nm rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth of the disposable
incomeof the old (capital income minus taxes on the old), that is, if
{At[(1(kt))kt9t_(1+n)_lriI(1+n)t} =022,wehave
(111.25) lint sup{AtptBt+i} ￿ 0
V-kr t'<t￿0
Iflint inf{atptB÷i} = lint sup {AtptBi} = 0, then we also have
t'—i
lintApB1 = 0. This meansthatwhen the long—nm rate of interest exceeds
t-'w
the long—nm growth rate of the disposable incomeof the young and of the old,
theconventional solvency constraint emerges.
Ifthe taxes paid (transfers received) by each generation are
distortionary, it is unlikely that the long—run growth rate of per capita
taxes (transfers) can exceed the long—nm growth rate of productivity. There
will be some finite upper bound on the ratio of taxes and transfersper
generation to the real (physical) resources owned by that generation. Tax
administration and collection costs that are strictly convex functions of the
amount of taxes raised, will also put a finite upper bound on the ratio of
taxes paid to real resources owned (see Barro [1976], Iccallun [1984],Kremers
[1989)and Bohn [1991}).
Wesummarize the foregoing discussion in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 2.
Theconventional government solvency constraint(tinAtptBt+j=0)23 isimplied
byour solvency constraint (IIL8a,b and c) if
(a) The long—rum interest rate exceeds thelong—rungrowth rate of efficiency
labor (tin AtG j-1n)t =0)
tcD
and
(6) Either, thenettaxpaidby any generation at a given age cannot change sign
over the lifetime of that generation,
or, the long—run growth rate of taxes paid or transfers received at a given
age by a generation is less than the long—run rate of interest.
Inorder for the public debt to grow at least as fast as the rate of
interest forever, when the rate of interest is above the growth rate of
efficiency labor, it must be possible to make transfer payments to a
generation when it is young andto tax it when it is old; in addition, the
growth rate of these taxes and transfers must be at least as high as the
interest rate24. Note that it is only the taxes on or transfers to each
generation that must have a growth rate at least as high as the interest rate.
Aggregatetaxes net of transfers, r?Lt +riLt,neednot grow at all, as
Case 4below makes clear.
Case4:Restrictions on how taxes can changefrot period to period.
Yeconsider the example of age—specific taxes growing at a common (but
not necessarily constant) growth rate, that is r r_i(1t) and
=2o1.c)for all t ￿ 0. This is an interesting case becausein many
models, taxes on the young will grow, from one generation to the next, at the25
same rate as taxes on the old in steady state. We define
E fJ1+tj)t￿ 0.
In this case the relevant solvency constraints become
S—(1+pt)KtS ptBti + T41t(1+n)t c wL




Let r be negative and positive, with + (l+n1r21 =0.As long
as is positive, the public debt always grows at least as fast as the rate
of interest, since ptBt+j —(rt)P_iB
E Ct — +(1+nY1r2i]t(1+n)t and
C 0. The actual value of (and thus of each period can be chosen so
as to keep ptBt÷i + rWt(1+n)t invariant under different choices of and
independent of the growth rate of of ptBt+i.
Despitethese restrictions, we can still make transfer payments to the
young and impose taxes on the old. In addition, we can choose, each period,
the coiwon growth rate of per capita taxes on the old and per capita transfer
payments to the young. If C0 forall t, we can make the growth rate of
public debt exactly equal to the interest rate each period.
(B')THREEEQUIVALENCE RESULTS.
Wecannow can state our first equivalence result:
Proposition 3.
Given initial valuesand b0 and a feasible sequence g, t ￿ 0 ,any
equilibrium for Pj' k1, candc with arbitrary paths of debts b and of
lump—sum taxes and transfers r and r for all i ￿ I can be replicated without
debt and deficits, that is by using balanced—budget lump—sum taxes and transfers
only.26
What this means is that, in a deterministic model, any intergenerational
redistribution that can be supported by debt and taxes can also be supported just
with taxes and without debt. In the stochastic case it is true in addition that any
intergenerationalinsurance supported with public debt, unbalanced budgets and age—
and generation—dependent lump—sum taxes can also be provided with a balanced
budget and without public debt.
Proof: An equilibrium is characterized for all t￿0 by equations (111.16) to
(111.20),the government solvency constraint given in (III.8a, b, andc) and
initial conditions k0 and b0. ye rewrite the first two inequalities of the




(IY.lb) (1÷r)p.ib —(i+wt+iy(i+n)ri ￿ f(k)
—ktf'(kt)
—





The proof is direct andconstructive. We firstconsider a "reference
equilibrium"supported by given sequencesof taxesand debt,denoted by single
overbars.Next we propose an alternative set of sequences of taxes and debt
(denoted by double overbars), which include the balanced—budget, zero public debt
sequences. Finally, we check by direct computation that the double overbar
sequences support the same equilibrium sequences of consumption and capital
accumulation as the single overbar sequences (note that exhaustive public
spendingis the same under both policies). Formally, consider paths b,27
and for all I ￿ 0 that support equilibrium pathsp k1cand 4forall
￿ I for given k0and .Weshow that for any other set of debt paths
II, there exists associated paths for lump—sum taxes and transfers
and 4, t￿0that support the same equilibrium pathsp, kt , and4 for t ￿ 1. Let the double overbar debt andtax sequencessatisfy (IY.3) and
(IV.4)






Equations (IV.3) and (IY.4) imply (IV.5)
(IY.5) 1T- = +et+k- Tj(t+l)J
i
—4t+i)]for all￿
Equation (IV.3) ensures that the economy—wide capital market equilibrium
condition(111.19) will be satisfied for the sane values ofp,
,4 and
(and therefore also the same values ofw1 ).Equation(IV.4) ensures that the
budget constraint of the old in period t given in (111.18) will be satisfied
for the same values of 4, k1and .Itis easilyverified that the
government budget identity in (111.20) willalso besatisfied under the double
overbar policies.Finally, it is obvious that if the government solvency
constraint is satisfied for the single overbar policy it will also be satisfied for the
double overbar policy.
The remaining equilibrium conditions (111.16), and(111.17)also hold
under the double overbar policy. To get Proposition 1we set =0for all
I ￿ 1.0
Thus any equilibrium with government debt and deficitscan be replicated28
byan economy in which the government budget is balanced period—by—period (and
the stock of debt is zero) by appropriate age—specific lump—sum taxes and
transfers.
It canbechecked easily that, iftheconventional government solvency
constraint(111.3) is satisfied under the single overbar policy, it is also
satisfied under the double overbar policy. The validity of Proposition 3,
unlike that of Proposition 4 and its Corollaries belov, is therefore not
dependent on the acceptability of our generalized solvency constraint. The
reason is that under the double overbar policy in the proof of Proposition 2,
taxes and transfers are not in any way restricted.
Proposition 3 is a generalization of the well—known proposition that an
equilibrium with positive public debt financed by taxes on the young is
equivalent to a balanced budget, pay—as—you—go (or unfunded) social security
retirementscheme in which lump—sumtaxes on the young are paid out as
lump—sum transfersto the old. Calvo andObstfeld[1988a,b] proved it for a
non—stochasticmodel.
Corollary 1.
Withunrestricted lump—atm taxes and transfers, public debt is redundant
or "inessential", that is, it does not permit additional eqtilibria to be
supported.
Corollary2.
Withunrestricted tazes and transfers, Ponzi finance is "inesseritial",
that is, it does not per-mit additional equilibria to be supported.29
Proposition 4.
Givenan initial value Ic0 and a sequence of exhaustive public spending g, t ￿ 0,
any equilibrium for v, cand c1 for all I0 supported by age— and
time—dependent lump—sum taxes and transfers but without public debt and with
balanced public sector budgets, can also be supported with age—independent (equal
per capita for both generations alive in any given period) lump—sum taxes and
transfers, provided unbalanced public sector budgets are allowed.
This means that any intergenerational redistribution and intergenerational
insurance supported with balanced—budget age—dependent lump—sum taxes and
transfers,can also be supported with age—independent lump—sum taxes andtranfers
butwith unbalanced public sector budgets. Note that, from Proposition 3,there
isno loss of generality in taking the benchmark equilibrium of Proposition 4
to have a balanced budget and zero public debt.
We shall give a detailed proof only for the case where the unbalanced
budget,age—independent tn—transfer policy involves equal per capita taxes on
both generations alive in any given period (Case 2b) of our taxonomy in
SectionIII. The proofs for equal taxes per generation (Case 2a) and equal
taxes per efficiency unit of labor (Case 2c) are virtually identical.
Proof: Variables with single overbars represent the benchmark balanced—budget
policy with age—dependent taxes and transfers. Variables with double overbars
represent the age—independent tn/transfer case with an unbalanced budget.
Note that =o , = —u + + and = =forall
I ￿ 0.
From equation (111.18) it follows that, if equivalence holds, it must be30
true that
(IV.7) Ptbt+i =(1+rt÷i['ci[?+i+t÷i(11F1 —
From(IV.?) and the government's single—period budget identity, (or
equivalently from the economy—wide capital market equilibrium condition
(111.19)), it follows that, if the double overbar regime supports the same
equilibria as the single overbar regime, it must be true that (IV.8) holds.
(IV.8) Ptbt+l =(1+n)1ç1[
—tI
Forany is is clear that a value of can be found to satisfy (IV.?)
and (IV.8). The other equilibrium conditions (111.16) and (111.17) are also
satisfied under the double overbar regime. The solvency constraint under the
single overbar regime is
(IY.9) ￿ f(kt) —ktf'(kt)
and
(IV.1O) o—1i ￿ (1+pt)kt
Under the double overbar regime the solvency constraint is
(IV.11) +(1+n)191￿f(k) —ktf'(kt)
and
(IV.12) Ptbt÷l +(1+n)1O1￿g —(1÷pt)kt
It is clear from (IY.S) that if the solvency constraint is satisfied under the
single over—bar regime ((IV.9) and (IV.10) hold), then it will also be
satisfied under the double overbar regime ((IV.11) and (IV.12) hold). a
While this completes the proof of Proposition 4, it is instructive to
investigate the behavior of taxes and of the public debt under the double
overbar regime. It tuns out that Ponzi finance of a special kind (the
sequence of government debt will have infinite subsequences that grow faster
than the rate of interest forever if the population growth rate is positive),31
will in general be necessary for the age—independent tax—transfer regime to
support the same equilibria as the unrestricted tax—transfer regime. Ponzi







At a given rate of interest, the unfunded balanced—budget social security
scheme(thesingle overbar scheme) increases the period t+1 value of the
lifetime resources of a representative member of generation i by
—(1 +r+i)
+(1+n)1
—(l+n)O1g1.The unbalanced budget scheme
with the age—independent taxes (the doubleoverbar scheme) adds the amount
—(1+r+j)tto the period t+1 value of the lifetime resources of a
representative member of generation t. Equation (IY.13) equates the two.
Note that the homogeneous part of equation (IV.13) changes sign each
period (imparting a saw—tooth pattern) and grows at a proportional rate 1 +r
in absolute value. The saw—tooth pattern of tax receipts is passed on to the
valueof the per capita debt through the government budget identity under the




Equations (IV.8) and(IV.14)imply that
(IV.15) =— (1+wt+i)'(l+r1)p1b1 —
+ (1÷n)ci(2+n)(e)





The value of the public debt under the age—independent tax,unbalanced
budgetpolicy, ptBt+i, is likely to zig—zag from a positive value in one32
period to a negative value in the next. If, for instance, and were
constant over time, the saw—tooth pattern of the public debt, with debt in the
homogeneous equation of (IV.16) having a growth factor of _(l+rt) each period,
(as signaled in Calvo and Obstfeld [1988bJ for an economy without population
growth or productivity growth) is immediately apparent.






Considerthe simple example where == 0and = =for
all t ￿ 0. Equation (IV.17) simplifies to
ptBt+2 =(1+n)2(1+rt(l+rt)p i8t —(2+n)rtiLti
Thenis negative (the balanced—budget scheme redistributes from the old
to the young) and r+1 is non—negative, the public debt will, over a
two—period horizon grow at a proportional rate at least equal to the sum of
the real interest rate and the growth rate of population. If n is
non—negative, the sequence of the public debt will therefore have infinite
subsequences that are characterized by Ponzi finance. Public credit too will,
over a two—period interval, grow at a rate asymptotically equal to the sum of
the interest rate and the growth rate of population. Note that "subsequence
Ponzi finance" is "essential" in this case.
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government
under the double overbar regime evolves according to
+ = _(1+n)(l+r) iBt+7t iLt )+ ?Lt+(1+n)(1+r)iLti)Corollary 1.
Proposition 4.holdswhen the restriction that per capita taxes are equal
for both generations alive in any given period is replaced by the
restriction that taxes per generation alive in any given period are
equal.
Whenthe age—restricted tax policy is given by Case 2a of Section III,
that is by equal taxes or transfers per generation, or (1+n) = the
public debt path that supports any balanced budget equilibrium with
unrestricted taxes and transfers is given by
(IV.18) PtBt÷i =—(l+r)ptiBt — +
Inthe simple example when =forall t and Lt is constant, the
public debt (and the public credit) will, over a two period horizon, grow
asymptotically at the rate of interest. Subsequence Ponzi finance is again
"essential".
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government
under the double overbar regime evolves according to
+tLt
=_(1+rt)(pBt+t L1) + + (1+r)T1L1
Corollary 2.
Proposition4. holds when the restriction that per capita taxes are equal
for both generations alive in any given period is replaced by the
restriction that taxes per efficiency unit of labor in any given period are
equal.
Whenthe age—restricted tax policy is given by Case 2c of Section III,
3334
that is by equal taxesor transfers per unit of efficiencylabor, or
= thepublic debt path that supports anybalanced budget





Again taking the simple example where =0and =forall t￿0,
itis easily seen that over a 2—period interval, the publicdebt (and the
publiccredit) will asymptotically growat the sumof the interest rate, the
growth rate of population and the growth rate of productivity. If the growth
rate of efficiency laboris non—negative, Ponzi finance will be feasible and
"essential".
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government





Givenan initial valueand a sequence of exhaustive public spendingg,
￿ 0, any equilibrium for p, k ,cand for all t ￿ 0 that can be
supported with a balanced budget and unrestricted lump—sum taxes and
transfers, can aLso be supported with taxes and transfers that are
required to have the same sign during the lifetime of each generation,
provided unbalanced budgets are allowed.
Proof: Under the balanced budget (single overbar) reference policy,
=0and +iLti
=forall t￿ 0.Under the double overbar
policy,we have (l+rt)pt1B ÷
— — ._iLt_iand =35
>0for all t ￿ 0. For the two policies to support the same equilibrius
(and for the double overbar policy to satisfy the solvency constraint if the
single overbar policy satisfies it) it must be the case that pB+ Lt =
(orequivalently that (1+r)p1B —iLt_i
=_?_iLi).









wesee that equations (IV.20) and (IY.21) can be satisfied through the
appropriate choice of (positive or negative) values for and for
anygivenpositive value of Atiandexogenouslygiven feasible values of
and
Consider, for instance, the special case where At =1,that is there
either has to be an equal tax or an equal transfer each period over the




Sincethe stock of debt can be negative as well as positive, the restriction
that and must have the same sign (or even be equal), does not prevent
the government from replicating any equilibrium supported by a balanced budget
policywith unrestricted taxes and transfers.
Since, by assumption, taxes paid to the government cannot change sign
over the life cycle, Ponzi finance is only possible underthe double overbar
policy if the interest rate is below the growth rate of efficiency labor.
This is obvious from (IV.20), as ?Lt +
Ati iLt1 —cannothave a36
long—run growth rate in excess of the growth rate of efficiency labor.
Proposition 3 states that public debt and deficits (and by implication
Ponzi finance) are redundant policy instruments as long as the fiscal
authorityhas unrestricted age—specific lump—sum taxes and transfers.
Proposition 4 and itstwo Corollaries andProposition 5 emphasize that a
fiscal authority with a restricted tax—transfer instrumentarium may be able to
use public debt anddeficitsas perfect substitutes for the missing
age—specifictaxes and transfers, provided the government solvency constraint
is specified as in (III.Sa,b and c). Essential (subsequence) Ponzi finance
may be a feature of these government borrowing and lending strategies (vide
Proposition 4 and its Corollaries).
Our approach to government solvency hasimplicationsfor the empirical
approachesto testing for government solvency (see e.g. Hamilton and Flavin
[l986J, Wilcox [1989], Corsetti [1990], Grilli11990) and Buiter and Patel [1991]).
All these papers used variants of the convergence—in—expectation version of the
conventional solvency criterion given in (III.3b), involving the long—run behavior
of the discounted public debt, that is, they tested
4.irnEt_1+TPt1+Tbt+T
(l÷nF1iirnAt_l+Tpl+TB+T =0(or its expectational counterpart).
Wehaveseen that even in economies in which the long—run rate of
interestexceeds the long—run growth rate of efficiency labor, Ponzi finance
may be feasible. As long as (1) the taxburdencanvaryfreely over the life
cycle of each generation (specifically if they can makenet positive transfer
paymentsto a generation when it is young andimposea net positive taxwhen
itis old, and (2) the transfers and taxes cangrow at least as fast as the
rate of interest, the potential for Ponzi finance exists. Note that the
empirically unlikely zig—zag pattern of the debt need not occur when the two37
generations alive during any given period can be treated differently by the
tax—transfer system (see the proof of Proposition 5).
(V)CONCLUSION.
Merelylooking at the stock of public debt, without attempting to
evaluate the total impact of the fiscal—financial policy nles on what
Auerbach, Cokhale and Kotlikoff [1991] have called the "generational accounts"
can be very misleading as an indicator of thefl degree of financial crowding out
pressure in the economy. We shoved that, given a sufficiently rich
tax—transfer menu, the government could achieve any desired intergenerational
redistribution and insurance with public debt, without it or indeed with
public credit. It is when tax—transfer options are constrained that the
option of public borrowing or lending becomes valuable, both for
intergenerational redistribution and for intergeneratIonal insurance.
The tax—smoothing proposition demonstrates how public debt can be useful
for conventional (not uncertainty—related) efficiency reasons in the absence
of non—distortionary taxes and transfers. Our paper complements this by
shoving how public debt can be useful in the pursuit of distributional
objectives and efficient intergenerational insurance schemes, if there is a
restrictedmenu of lump—sum taxes and transfers.
An important part in the proof of the proposition that government debt
can be used to take over the intergenerational redistribution and insurance
roles of missing age—specific taxes and transfers, was our specification of
the government solvency constraint. A government is solvent ifisdoes not
pursuepolicies that force the private sector into bankruptcy when there
exists an alternative policy that would not do so. The private sector is
bankrupt when the non—negativity constraints on consumption by the young,38
consumptionby the old or the capital stock become binding. The stock of
public debt is limited by the condition that the total amountofresources
takenby the governmentfrom the young, whether through borrowing or through
taxes,cannot exceed the wage income of the young. The stock of public credit
is likewise limited by the condition that the total amountofresources taken
by the government from the old, whether through the old servicing their debt
to the government or through taxes, cannot exceed the capital income of the
old.
Providedthe government canmake net transferpayments to a generation
when it is young andimposenet taxes on that generation when it is old, and
provided these transfer payments and taxescangrowat least at the rate of
interest,Ponzi finance is possible, regardless of the relationship between
the interest rate and the growth rate, and regardless of whether or not the
economy is dynamically inefficient or Pareto efficient. If either of these
assumptions is violated, our solvency constraint implies (when the long—run
interest rate exceeds the long—run growth rate of efficiency labor) that the
conventional solvency constraint applies: the sequence of public debt
discounted at the rate of interest converges to zero.39
REFERENCES
Abel, Andrew B. [1988], "The Implications of Insurance for the Efficacy of
Fiscal Policy", NBER Working Paper No. 2517, February.
Auerbach, Alan J., Jagadeesh Cokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoff [1991),
"Generational Accounts— A meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting",
NBER Working Paper No. 3589, January.
Barro, Robert J. [1976] ,"Replyto Feldstein and Buchanan", Journal of
Political lcono.y, 84, April, pp. 343—49.
[1979), "On the Determination of thePublic Debt",Journal of
Political Econo.y, 87, pp. 940—971.
Blanchard, O.J., Jean Claude Chouraqui, Robert P. Ragemann, and Nicola Sartor,
"The sustainability of fiscal policy: new answers to an old question",
OECD Econo.ic Studies, No. 15, pp. 7—36, Autumn, pp. 7—36.
Blanchard, 0. 3. and P. Veil [1992] ,"DynamicEfficiency, The Riskless Rate,
and Debt Ponzi Gaines Under Uncertainty", NBER Working Paper No. 3992,
February.
Bohn, Henning [1990J ,"Sustainabilityof Budget Deficits in a Stochastic
Economy", Mimeo, Department of Finance, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania.
[1991], "The sustainability of budget deficits with lump—sum and
with income—based taxation", Journal of Noney, Credit and Banking, 23,
No. 3, Pt. 2, August, pp. 580—604.
Buiter, Willem H. [1985], "A guide to public sector debt and deficits",
Econo.icPolicy, 1, November, pp. 13—79.
[1990) ,"DebtNeutrality, Redistribution and Consumer
Heterogeneity: A Survey and Some Extensions", in William C. Brainard,
William D. Nordhaus and Harold W. Watts eds, Money, Maaoeconomics
and Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA; also in V.11. Buiter,
Principles of Budgetary and Financial Policy, pp. 183—222, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
and Kenneth if. Kletzer [1990],"FiscalPolicy, Interdependence and
Efficiency", NBER Working Paper No. 3328, April.
_____and [1991 ,"TheWelfare Economics of Cooperative and
NoncooperativeFiscal Policy, 'Journalof Ecouo.ic Dynasics and Control,
15, pp. 215—244.
andUrjitR. Patel [1992], "Debt, deficits and inflation: An Application
tothe public finances of India", Journal of Public Econo.ics,
forthcoming.40
Calvo,Guillermo A. andMauriceObstfeld çl9ssa] ,"OptimalTime—Consistent
Fiscal Policy with Finite Lifetimes,' Econosetrica 56(2), March, 411—432.
_____and_____[l988b , "OptimalTime—Consistent Fiscal Policy with Finite
Lifetimes:Analysis andExtensions", in E.Helpman,A.Razinand E.
Sadka(eds.), Econo.ic Effects of the Governaent Budget,163—198,MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Corsetti, Giancarlo [1990J, "Testingfor solvency of the public sector: An
application to Italy', Yale University, Economic growth Center Discussion
Paper No. 617, September.
Diamond, Peter A. [1965], "National Debt in a Neo—Classical Growth Model,"
American Econosic Review 551126—1150.
Eaton,J. and H.Rosen [1980], Taxation, HumanCapitalandUncertainty",
American Econo.ic Review, 70, pp. 705—715.
Enders, V. and H.E. Lapan [1982], "Social Security Taxation and
Intergenerational Risk Sharing", International. Econotic Review, 23, pp.
647—658.
Feldstein, Martin [1988], "The Effectsof Fiscal Policies WhenIncomes are
Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence", American Econotic
Review, 78, pp. 14—23.
[1989] ,"ImperfectAnnuities Markets, Unintended Bequests,
andthe Optimal Age Structure of Social Security Benefits.", NEER Working
Paper No. 2820, January.
Fischer,Stanley [1983] ,"Welfareaspects of government issue of indexed
bonds", in It. Dornbusch and M. H. Simonsen, Inflation, Debt, and
Indexation, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 223—246.
Gale, Douglas [1990], "The efficient design of public debt", in ft. Dornbusch
and H. Draghi eds. Issues in Debt •anzlhgeaent, forthcoming-.
Gordon, Roger H. and Hal ft. Varian [1988), "Intergenerational Risk Sharing",
Journal of Public Econo.ics, 37, pp.185—202.
Grilli, V. [1989], "Seigniorage in Europe", in I. de Cecco andA. Giovannini
eds. A European Central Bank?, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge
U.K., pp. 53—79.
Hamilton, J.D. andLA.Flavin [1986], "On the limitations of government
borrowing: A framework forempirical testing", A.erican Econotic Review,
76,September, pp. 808—819.
llayashi, Fumio, Joseph Altonji andLaurenceKotlikoff L1991'"Risk—Sharing,
Altruism, andtheFactor Structure of Consumption ,fiBERWorking Paper
No. 3834, September.
Kaplow, Louis [1991], "A note on taxation as social insurance for uncertain
laborincome", NBER Working Paper No. 3708, May.41
Kimball,Miles S. andN.Gregory Mankiw [1989J, "Precautionary Saving andthe
Timing of Taxes", Journal of Political Econo.y, 97, pp. 863—879.
Kremers, Jeroen [1989], •5•FederalIndebtedness and the Conduct of Fiscal
Policy, Journal of Monetary Econo.ics, 23, pp. 219—38.
McCallum, Bennett T. [1984}, "Are bond—financed deficits inflationary? A
Ricardian analysis", Journal of Political Econoay, 92, February,pp. 123—135
lerton, R.C. {19841, "On the Role of Social Security as a MeansforEfficient
Risk—Bearing in an Economy where Human Capital is not Tradable", in Zvi
Bodie andJohnShoven, Eds. Financial Aspects of the United States
Pension System, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.
O'Connell, Stephen A. andStephenP. Zeldes [1988], "Rational Ponzi Games" InternationalEconomic Review, 29, pp. 431—450.
Pagano,Marco [1988), "The management of public debt andfinancialmarkets", in F.Giavazzi andL. Spaventaeds. HighPublicDebt: the Italian
Experience, Cambridge University Press, pp. 135—166.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1958], "An exact consumption—loan model of interest with
orwithout the social contrivance of money", Journal of Political
Economy, 66,pp. 467—482.
Shell, Karl [1971], "Notes on the Economics of Infinity", Journal of Political
Economy, 79, pp. 1002—1011.
Spaventa, L.[1987],"The grovth of public debt: sustainability, fiscal rules,
andmonetaryrules", 111 Staff Papers, 34.
[1988], "Discussion", in F.Ciavazzi andL. Spaventa eds. High PublicDebt: theItalian Experience, Cambridge University Press, pp. 173—176.
Stiglitz,J. f1983],"Onthe Relevance or Irrelevance of Public Financial
Policy: Indexation, PriceRigidities, and Optimal Monetary Policies", in
K. Dornbusch and Mario Henrique Simonsen, eds. Inflation, Debt and
Indention,MIT Press, Cambridge, IA., pp. 183—222.
Varian,H.R.[1980J, "Redistributive taxation as social insurance", Journal of Public
Economics,17, pp. 49—68.
Vilcox, D.V. [1989] ,Thesustainability of government deficits: Implications
of the present value borrowing constraint", Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 21,August, pp. 291—306.
Vilson, Charles A. [1981], "Equilibrium in dynamicmodels with an infinity of
agents", Journal of Economic Theory, 24, pp. 95—111.
Zilcha, Itzhak [1990] ,"DynamicEfficiency in Overlapping Generations Models
with Stochastic Production", Journal of Economic Theory, 52,pp. 364—379.42
NOTES
'With distortionary (non—lump--sum) taxes and transfers, real equilibria
will almost always be affected by the ability, offered by unbalanced budgets,
towary the pattern over time of the excess burdens associated with the use of
distortionary instruments. Seee.g. Barro [1979].
2SeeBuiter [1990]fora discussion of the roles of different kinds of
heterogeneityin a number of standard OLG models.
31tis the institution ofgovernment thatmustbe infinite—lived, not any
particularset of incumbent politicians. Specifically, what is required that
agovernment does not repudiate the debt incurred by its predecessors.
4Earlier versions of these propositions canbefound in Buiter and Kletzer
[1990, 1991].
'For an analysis of private intergenerational risk sharing motivated
through altruism see Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff [1991].
'Apart from the incomplete market participation thatisintrinsic to
OLGmodels without the institution of hereditary slavery, more stan4ard types
of insurance market failures can also create a potential welfare—improving
role for taxes, transfer payments and public debt. For instance, in the presence
of uncertain lifetimes (a feature that is absent from our model), a compulsory social
security retirement scheme can provide an annuity that is actuarially fairer than
those provided by the voluntary private annuities market which is adversely affected
by adverse selection (see Abel andFeldstein (1989)). Eaton and Rosen 119801,
Varian 11980], Feldstein [1988], Kimball and Naákiw [1989] and Kaplow J1991J
discuss how income taxation can serve as social insurance against uncertainties in
labor income. The positive and welfare consequences of such social insurance will of
course depend on the availability and nature of private insurance arrangements and
the reasons for the absence of a set of complete insurance markets. Typically,
adverse selection problems can be mitigated by compulsory social insurance through
the tn-transfer mechanism while moral hazard problems affect efficient public
provision of insurance as much as private provision.
7Allovingfor longer maturity debt would add notation but would not affect
the equivalence results.
'The single—period utility function v is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
concave, increasing in c1 and c2 and satisfies the Inada conditions.
5Since taxes, coupon payments and the marginal product of capital can be
stochastic,itmay not be possible to satisfy (I1.3a,b) for non—negative values of 4
and/orc. While labor productivity andthe marginal product of capital are
assumedto be positive, it may not be possible to satisfy the constraints
4￿0, c_1 ￿ 0, I÷ 0 and C ￿ 0for arbitrary public debt, tax and
transfer sequences. Our government solvency constraint is in fact exactly the
constraint that households are not forced into bankruptcy by government
policy.
Note that for arbitrary government policies, private bankruptcy might
occur even if individuals cannot borrow from the government (bd ￿ 0), because43
even without private debt to the government, the old might not have enough
resources to pay the stochastic taxes. If the constraints 4,cowere
imposed, even non—contingent debt issued by private individuals (bd c 0) would in
general be risky debt, with gross rate of return 1 + rt+1 if there is no bankruptcy
(c > 0) and gross rate of return max{0, ((1 + p+)4+—
otherwise.With or without private debt to the government, the old might not
have enough resources to pay taxes. Assuming that taxes owed to the government
have the same priority as interest owed to the government, actual taxes plus
interest paid by the old would be given by min{r +t+i4+i'(1 +
It is even possible that the young would not be able to pay their taxes. This would
be the case if w plus the madmal amount the young could borrow were less than
lj.Allowingfor this would greatly complicate the exposition but would not affect
our equivalence results, as long as taxes and interest owed would be subject to
the same treatment.
'Wedo not impose the constraints kd ￿ 0 and bd ￿0.Since in the
household decision problem Vstandsfor equity, that is ownership claims to
the stock of physical capital, there is no reason the household cannotgo
short in it. We could also allow households to issue state—contingent debt.
What we are implicitly assuming in our formal model is that the debt they
issue is identical to government debt. The introduction of private debt does
therefore not increase the asset menu.
11The consumer's optimum will be turn out to be interior because (1) the
utility function satisfies the Inada conditions, (2) the wage rate, the gross
return on debt and the gross return on capital are positive and (3) government
policy does not drive consumers to bankruptcy. Equations (II.4a,b) anticipate
points (2) and (3), which are introduced later in Section II, respectively in
Section III.
'2Note that when debt is riskless, (II.4a,b) imply the familiar risk premium
forcapital formula Etpt+i =r+i
—
Covt[pt+i,v'(c)J, where Cov denotes the
Etv'(c)
conditional variance operator.
'3Public consumption can bean argumentin the private utility function.
As long as it enters in an additively separable way, it will not affect the
first—orderconditions for private consumption. Since we are interested in
characterizing feasible fiscal strategies rather than optimal ones, we model
public consumption as a pure waste of resources. Public sector capital
formation could be added to our list of fiscal instruments in a
straightforward manner andisomitted only because of space limitations.
"Often the weaker solvency criterion that (111.3) hold in expectationonly,is
imposed for stochastic models, that is Et
St_1+rPt_I+Tbt÷r
EEt Atl+rPtl+TBt+T =0.Bohn[1990)arguesquiteconvincingly,44
however,that the solvency criterion should apply to all realizations of the
discounted debt process, andnotjust to its mathematical expectation. See
alsoBlanchard and Veil [1992]
"Whenonlythe expectation of the discounted debt is required to go to




161f weextended the government financial liability menu, say by allowing
longermaturity debt, the definition would have to be adapted to the specific
set of governmentdebt instruments allowed. The statement that the government
never runsa primary surplus, always defines Ponzi finance.
liThis is inthe spirit of O'Connell andZeldes[1988) ,whopoint out that
in order for the government to run a "rational" Ponzi scheme, a rational
private sector must be willing to be at the receiving end of such a scheme.
°Note that in our model both the wage rate and the marginal product of
capital are positive, because of we restrict the level of labor—augmenting
productivity to be postive. Without a government sector, private bankruptcy
would therefore not occur. If the technology were to permit private
bankruptcy even without a government, our solvency constraint would be
modified as follows. The government does not select sequences for taxes,
transfer payments, debt and exhaustive spending that will cause the
non—negativity constraints on consumption by both generations and on the
capitalstock to become binding if there exist alteniativesequencesof the
government instruments that would avoid this.




"Note that such a tax is not perceived by those investing in government
debt as a "tax on debt" affecting expected returns from holding debt, even if
thetax isfully anticipated. It is perceived as lump—sum,thatis the amount
paidisperceived as independent of the actions of the tax payer, including
her portfolio choice.
21lcCallum's specification of the private sector solvency constraint (which
is not well motivated) still implies that the long—rim growth rate of the
public debt must the less than the private rate of time preference.
"Or, equivalently, if lim {A[(g —(1÷f'(k))kt)Ot
—r](1+n)t}
=0,
23Strictly speaking this should be urninf{8tt8+} S 0 and
t''rnt'<t<T
urn sup{AtptBti} ￿ 0. If the lin inf and the lim sup are both equal to
V—smV(r<w
zerothen lim AtptBt1 =
24Whatwe require, strictly speaking, is the the sequences of taxes and45
transfersper generation, and haveinfinite
subsequenees {r Lt }and{r_1)_0whose elements have a growth rate 333 3 3
at least as high as the interest rate.
25Notethat, although candepend on and therefore on —
candepend only onand therefore not on If you tax the young more in
period t under the double overbar policy than under the single overbar policy,
you will borrow less (equation (111.9)). In period t+l the taxes on the old
generation can be lower under the double overbar policy by (l+r÷i) tines the
amount by which the taxes they paid in period t (when they were young) were
higher .Thisleaves the life—time budget constraint unaffected.